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pipeline: reject resref collisions when chunking; document erf post-write hashing (#8)
## What

Two correctness fixes surfaced in review of the direct-depot HAK artifact work.

### Reject resref+type collisions in `chunksFromManifest`

A manifest can name two distinct source paths that collapse to the same
`resref+type` (e.g. `creature/foo.tga` and `placeable/foo.tga` — resref is the
lowercase basename minus extension). The ERF writer keys resources on
`Name:Type`, so the second silently shadowed the first: an asset would vanish
from the packed HAK with no error.

`chunksFromManifest` now runs `ensureUniqueChunkResources` per chunk and fails
the build on a duplicate. This guards **both** build paths — the legacy
`--source-manifest` flow and the direct content-addressed flow
(`chunksFromSourceManifest` → `chunksFromManifest`).

### Document erf post-write hash coupling

`writeResourceData` streams the source into the output while hashing, so
size/SHA mismatches are only detected *after* the bytes are written. A non-nil
return therefore means the writer holds partial, unverified output and the
caller must discard it. Added a comment making that contract explicit;
`writeHAKArchive` already honours it (writes to a temp file, removes on any
Write error, never renames a bad archive into place).

## Tests

- `TestChunksFromManifestRejectsResrefCollision`: collision → error, distinct
  resrefs → clean. Asserts only error presence/absence — silent asset loss is
  the contract, not any specific wording.
- `go vet ./internal/erf/ ./internal/pipeline/` clean.
- `go test ./internal/erf/ ./internal/pipeline/` green.

## Follow-up

A new crucible release must be cut after this merges so the guard ships in the
binary `sow-assets-manifest` pins.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

Reviewed-on: #8
Co-authored-by: vickydotbat <vickydotbat@tutamail.com>
Co-committed-by: vickydotbat <vickydotbat@tutamail.com>
2026-06-20 07:53:04 +00:00

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---
description: sow-tools / Crucible — the build/conversion/sync toolchain repo.
alwaysApply: true
---
# sow-tools / Crucible Agent Guide
This repo owns the **builder logic:** one Go module
(`git.westgate.pw/ShadowsOverWestgate/sow-tools`) producing the `crucible`
dispatcher and the `crucible-<name>` binaries.
## What this repo owns / does not own
Owns: build/extract/validate/compare pipeline, ERF/HAK packing, topdata 2da/tlk
compilation, wiki rendering/deploy, depot blob verify, music conversion,
changelog. Does **not** own authored game content (that is `sow-module` /
`sow-topdata` / `sow-assets-manifest`) or any production deploy authority (that
is `sow-platform`).
## Rules
1. **Fail closed, never fake.** A builder with no migrated logic yet (`depot`)
exits `70`. Do not stub a builder to emit a placeholder artifact.
2. **Binaries are not committed.** They are CI artifacts / image layers.
`/bin/`, `*.exe`, `nwn-tool`, `sow-toolkit` are gitignored.
3. **The registry is the command surface.** `internal/dispatch.Registry` is the
single source of truth; keep it in sync with `cmd/` and
[`docs/command-surface.md`](docs/command-surface.md). Adding a builder = a
`cmd/crucible-<name>/main.go` shim + a `Registry` entry + a doc row.
## Wiring a builder
1. Ensure the relevant `internal/` package(s) cover the work.
2. Add tests; keep outputs deterministic (same input → same bytes).
3. `make check` must stay green; update `make smoke` to expect the wired exit.
## Commands
```bash
nix develop && make check # vet + test + shellcheck + yamllint
make build # cmd/* -> ./bin
make smoke # assert fail-closed contract
make image # crucible:<sha>
```
## Tests
Tests must survive harmless changes to constants, defaults, wording, ordering, fixture data, and internal implementation details. A test that fails merely because a basic value changed is usually a bad test. Only assert exact values when the value is part of a documented public contract, external protocol, compatibility requirement, security rule, migration, or business rule.